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Abstract
At present, network users have to remember a user-
name and a corresponding password for every ser-
vice with which they are registered. Single Sign-On
(SSO) has been proposed as a solution to the usabi-
lity, security and management implications of this
situation. Under SSO, users authenticate them-
selves only once to an entity termed the ‘Authen-
tication Service Provider’ (ASP) and subsequently
use disparate Service Providers (SPs) without re-
authenticating. The information about the user’s
authentication status is handled between the ASP
and the desired SP in a manner transparent to the
user. In this paper we propose a SSO protocol
where a GSM or UMTS operator plays the role of
the ASP and by which its subscribers can be au-
thenticated to SPs without any user interaction and
in a way that preserves the user’s privacy and mo-
bility. The protocol only requires minimal changes
to the deployed GSM infrastructure.
Keywords: single sign-on, authentication,
GSM, UMTS
1 Introduction
Network users have to remember a username and
password for every Service Provider1 (SP) they are
registered with. If they could remember different,
ideally ‘secure’ [4] passwords (and corresponding
∗The author is sponsored by the State’s Scholarship
Foundation of Greece.
1In the context of this paper a service provider is any
entity that provides some kind of service or content to a user.
Examples of SPs include messenger services, FTP sites, web
sites and streaming media providers.
user names) for every such SP, they might have
done everything they could from their perspective
with respect to security. Unfortunately, this has
proven to be very difficult, and thus users either
record their passwords (on paper or in a computer
file), or, more commonly, use the same password
with every SP. This has serious security implica-
tions, most obviously that an SP can impersonate
a user to all other SPs with whom the same pass-
word has been used. Thus, say, the administrator
of a (personalisable) news website might be able to
access a portal visitor’s bank account, credit card
numbers, emails or health records.
Single sign-on (SSO) is a technique where users
authenticate themselves only once to a trusted Au-
thentication Service Provider (ASP), and are au-
tomatically logged into the SPs they subsequently
use, without necessarily having to re-authenticate
each time. Under SSO, SPs need some form
of notification from the ASP that indicates the
user’s authentication status. These notifications
are termed authentication assertions. SPs assess
the provided authentication assertions and decide
whether or not to grant access to a protected re-
source to the specified user. SSO both increases the
usability of the network and eliminates the security
implications mentioned above (but introduces its
own).
The Liberty Alliance2, a consortium of over
160 companies, has developed a set of open spec-
ifications that, among other things, provide web-
based SSO. In the Liberty architecture, a trusted
third party acts as the ASP which authenticates
users and subsequently provides authentication as-
sertions to relying SPs. Relationships between ASP
2www.projectliberty.org
and SPs are based on contractual agreements out-
side the scope of the specifications.
The actual authentication method used by the
ASP is not specified by Liberty. Authentication
assertions do, however, include descriptions of the
initial user identification procedure at the ASP,
physical, operational and technical protection pro-
cedures, and the authentication method used, [10].
In this paper we propose a SSO protocol
where a Global System for Mobile communications
(GSM) operator acts as the ASP. The associated
authentication method is similar to authentication
of subscribers in a GSM network, in that it uses a
secret shared between network operator and sub-
scriber. The proposed scheme requires only min-
imal changes to the deployed GSM infrastructure
and can potentially be accommodated by the Lib-
erty specifications.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 reviews the GSM data confidentiality ser-
vice. Section 3 describes the proposed protocol
for user authentication and SSO using GSM, while
section 4 analyses the associated security threats.
Section 5 discusses the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the protocol. In section 6 the protocol is
extended to cover the Universal Mobile Telephone
System (UMTS). Finally, sections 7 and 8 give an
overview of related work and conclusions.
2 The GSM data confidential-
ity
service
Subscriber data confidentiality for the GSM air
interface is based on a long-term secret key Ki,
shared between the Subscriber’s Identity Module
(SIM) and the Authentication Center (AuC) of the
home network operator. A secret session key is gen-
erated by both parties during subscriber authenti-
cation, as described below. (Only the steps relevant
to this paper are shown; comprehensive descrip-
tions of GSM air interface security can be found in
[1, 5, 6, 17, 18]).
1. The home network generates a random chal-
lenge (RAND), and uses the shared secret key
Figure 1: PC as network access device.
Ki to compute a secret session key Kc as fol-
lows:
Kc = A8Ki(RAND)
where A8 is a network-specific key derivation
function. The values of RAND and Kc are
then passed to the visited network.
2. The visited network sends the value RAND to
the Mobile Equipment (ME).
3. The ME passes the RAND to the SIM which
recomputes Kc using its stored value of Ki.
The key Kc is then output by the SIM to the
ME.
The secret session key Kc is used for data and
signalling encryption in GSM. It is important to
note that the shared secretKi never leaves the sub-
scriber’s SIM card or the home network operator’s
AuC.
3 Using GSM for SSO
This section describes the proposed authentication
method and the associated SSO protocol as well as
the involved entities.
3.1 System entities
The main components are the User System, the SP
and the GSM operator’s AuC.
3.1.1 User System
The User System (US) consists of a network ac-
cess device, a SIM card and a SIM card reader.
The device might be a PC, with a GSM Mobile
Equipment (ME), e.g. a GSM phone, as the SIM
Figure 2: Combined mobile equipment and network
access device
card reader. The PC and ME need to be inter-
connected, e.g. using a cable, infrared, Bluetooth
(www.bluetooth.com) or a Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) [7]. Regardless of the method
used, it is assumed that the link is protected against
eavesdropping. This configuration is shown in Fig-
ure 1. Alternatively, the access device and SIM
card reader could be combined, e.g. in a Wireless
Application Protocol (www.wapforum.org) enabled
device — see Figure 2.
The US is the entity through which the end
user authenticates to the AuC and subsequently
achieves SSO at different SPs. It should be noted
that no direct communication between US and AuC
takes place in the proposed protocol; messages are
‘routed’ through the SP. However, the US and the
AuC need to agree on the use of a Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) function [14].
3.1.2 Service Provider and Authentication
Center
It is assumed that the relationship between SPs
and GSM operators is regulated by contractual
agreements which are beyond the scope of this pa-
per. To avoid the need for large numbers of such
agreements, the SP/GSM relationship could be es-
tablished via one of a relatively small number of
third parties providing a ‘broker’ service. Such a
third party could be established specifically to sup-
port this SSO scheme. It is also assumed that the
SPs and the AuC have the means to establish an
authenticated and integrity protected communica-
tions channel (see section 4.5). This might involve
routing all communications via the trusted third
party that is brokering relationships between SPs
and GSM operators.
In the scheme described here, the GSM opera-
tor’s AuC acts as the ASP for a number of relying
SPs (in Liberty terms, the GSM operator and as-
sociated SPs form a circle of trust [9]). As in any
SSO scheme, the AuC needs to be trusted for the
purposes of authentication by both the end-users
and the SPs.
3.2 The authentication and SSO
protocol
The proposed protocol starts whenever the SP
wishes to authenticate the user, e.g. when the user
requests a protected resource from the SP; it is also
used whenever the SP decides that the user has to
be re-authenticated. The protocol consists of a se-
ries of four messages that are exchanged as follows:
1. SP → US: RAND
2. US → SP: IMSI, MACKc(SPID)
3. SP → AuC: IMSI, MACKc(SPID), RAND
4. AuC → SP: Authentication Assertion or Fail-
ure Notification
In message 1, the SP sends a random challenge
(RAND) to the US. The US forwards the RAND to
the SIM which then computes a secret session key
Kc as described in section 2. The key is returned to
the US. The US must also extract the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) from the SIM at
some point — this can be done with a standard
‘call’ to the SIM. The IMSI uniquely identifies the
home network and the user’s subscription.
The US then computes, using key Kc, a MAC
on the unique identifier (SPID) of the SP that
wishes to authenticate the user. It should be noted
that Kc, as in [8], is used here for MAC computa-
tion, whilst it was designed for data encryption. If
this breach of the key separation principle is a con-
cern then Kc could be passed through a one-way
hash function (such as SHA-1 [14]) before being
used for the MAC computation [8]. The US con-
structs message 2 which consists of the IMSI and
the MAC and sends it to the SP.
The SP looks at the Mobile Country Code
(MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC) fields in
the received IMSI to determine the address of the
AuC of the user’s GSM operator. In message 3 the
SP simply forwards the IMSI and the MAC it re-
ceived from the US to the AuC, and appends the
RAND from message 1. In Liberty terms [13] mes-
sage 3 corresponds to an authentication request.
The AuC finds the secret key Ki correspond-
ing to the IMSI of message 3 and derives Kc using
the given RAND. It then computes a MAC using
Kc (or its hash value) on the SPID of the SP from
which it received message 3. If the resulting value
matches the MAC received in message 3 the user is
deemed authenticated at the AuC. In that case, the
AuC sends an authentication assertion to the SP in
message 4. Otherwise, message 4 is a failure notifi-
cation. In Liberty terms this message corresponds
to an authentication response.
SPs differentiate between users based on their
IMSIs. Thus, the protocol can also be used for ini-
tial user registration; the SP creates an account for
a newly encountered IMSI. Whether or not individ-
ual SPs keep more information about users in their
accounts and how this is mapped to their IMSIs is
outside the scope of this paper.
In the US, the protocol might be implemented
as a continuously running process (also known as a
‘service’ or ‘dæmon’) or as part of the client soft-
ware that is used to access the service offered by the
SP. In the SP, the protocol would have to be imple-
mented by the software that offers the service (the
‘server software’). A File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
SP, for example, would have to support the pro-
tocol at the FTP server software level. The GSM
operator would most likely implement the protocol
as a process that runs continuously on a dedicated
‘SSO server’.
4 Threat analysis
This section considers threats to the scheme and
corresponding countermeasures. Each potential at-
tack is considered separately.
4.1 Stolen SIM attack
An attacker with a stolen SIM is potentially able
to make fraudulent phone calls at the owner’s ex-
pense, at least until the SIM is reported stolen
and blocked, assuming that the SIM is not PIN-
protected. Typically, SIM cards are stolen with
the ME, and the thief also thus gains access to
any personal information in the SIM and ME. In
the context of the scheme described above, a SIM
thief can also impersonate the user to all SPs that
support SSO using the proposed protocol. For low
or medium value services (such as news portals or
email) this risk might be acceptable, compared to
the costs associated with SIM card/ME theft. How-
ever, for high value services (e.g. online banking,
e-commerce or business email) the SSO mechanism
may need to be combined with another authentica-
tion method, e.g. username and password. In such
a case an attacker will need both the user SIM and
password to impersonate the user to an SP. Also,
once the user realises that the SIM has been stolen
(typically soon after the incident) and reports this
to the GSM operator, the SIM will be blacklisted
and impersonation prevented.
4.2 SIM cloning attack
A SIM card can be cloned (or emulated through
software) if the secret key Ki can be extracted. An
attack exploiting a weakness in the COMP128v.1
algorithm, which was used by some GSM operators
in early SIMs, enables key extraction; see, for ex-
ample, [19]. Although this is not an attack against
the protocol proposed in this paper, cloned SIMs
enable the attacker to impersonate subscribers at
the GSM network, and therefore at SPs. In any
case, as mentioned in section 4.1, high value ser-
vices should be protected by an additional authen-
tication mechanism.
4.3 Compromise of privacy
Unlike the protocol described in [8], the scheme
does not involve the user’s Mobile Subscriber In-
tegrated Service Digital Network number or any
identifying information other than the IMSI. As
the mapping between the IMSI and other user
data is kept at the trusted AuC, SPs and eaves-
droppers only learn the user’s home GSM operator
(this information is needed anyway — see section
3.2). Given that each GSM operator has many sub-
scribers, learning a user’s operator is not likely to
be a major breach of privacy.
If dishonest SPs collude they can correlate in-
formation about common users without their con-
sent, using their IMSIs. To address this privacy
threat, Liberty specifies the use of different, opaque
user handles for each ASP/SP association [11].
However, complete prevention of the ‘SP collusion
attack’ is hard as SPs can still correlate users based
on other profile information they may maintain,
e.g. names or phone numbers. As stated in the
Liberty specifications [12, p.71], ‘The only protec-
tion is for Principals [users] to be cautious when
they choose service providers and understand their
privacy policies’.
4.4 Reflection attack
An attacker could forward message 1 received from
an SP as part of the authentication process to a
victim user, while masquerading as the SP to the
user (maybe by spoofing the SP’s network address
and/or interface). Forwarding the user’s valid re-
sponse (message 2) to the SP might result in suc-
cessful impersonation.
It is thus important for the user to authenti-
cate the origin of message 1. This can be achieved
using a suitable challenge/response protocol or an
SSL/TLS channel with server side certificates3. Of
course, simply trusting the root certificates that
come pre-configured in popular web browsers in-
volves certain risks. Ideally, the user should explic-
itly enable every root key involved in verifying SP
certificates.
It should be noted that the reflection attack is
not prevented if launched by a dishonest SP. How-
ever, as explained in section 4.3, users should be
cautious when they choose SPs.
4.5 Attacks on the SP/AuC Link
An attacker able to modify network traffic between
an SP and an AuC will be able to defeat the system,
since the AuC will not be able to determine which
SP requested an assertion (the origin of message 3
3Since the user requests a protected resource, it is likely
that a SSL/TLS connection will be required anyway.
could be altered) and, more importantly, relying
SPs would not be able to have confidence in authen-
tication assertions (message 4). Origin authentica-
tion and integrity protection for messages 3 and 4
is therefore a fundamental requirement. There ex-
ist well-established techniques that address this re-
quirement, for example SSL/TLS with both server
and client side certificates [16], IPsec tunnelling, or
a Virtual Private Network [17].
4.6 Replay attack
A network eavesdropper could capture message 2
of a previous protocol run between a US and an
SP. The attacker might later replay that message
to try to impersonate the user to the SP. The at-
tack will only succeed if the SP challenges the at-
tacker with the same RAND (in message 1) as it
used previously. It is therefore important for SPs
to use numbers with good randomness properties,
such that the probability of challenging a given user
with the same number twice is negligible. An SP
that does not follow this policy, however, only ren-
ders itself (and not other SPs) vulnerable to this
kind of attack.
4.7 Attacks against the Authentica-
tion Center
As for any ASP in an SSO scheme, the AuC is a
central point of failure and is therefore a component
highly susceptible to service denial attacks. The
AuC, at the same time, is the only entity trusted
by both end-users and SPs. It is assumed that the
GSM network operator will not abuse this trust and
that the AuC will be well-protected against service
denial and illegal access. This is likely to be true
in any event, as AuC failure would also bring down
the entire GSM network.
5 Advantages and disadvan-
tages
This section briefly discusses the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed authentication
method and SSO protocol.
Advantages resulting from the synergy of com-
bining GSM with SSO include the following.
  No user interaction is required. This yields
transparent user authentication at the SP.
One envisioned scenario is that users, without
taking their mobile phones out of their pock-
ets, approach (public) network access devices
and are transparently logged into the SPs they
subsequently use.
  As the authentication method is transpar-
ent, it can be repeated whenever appropri-
ate. An online banking SP, for example, can,
at any time during a session, request user re-
authentication for every sensitive resource re-
quested. This increases the achieved level of
security without usability implications.
  As the user’s SIM card is used for every
(re)authentication, there is a simple single lo-
gout mechanism. Once the user leaves, re-
authentication will fail and the SP can log the
user out without user interaction.
  No sensitive information (such as usernames,
passwords or cryptographic keys) is sent over
the network. This protects the user’s privacy.
Furthermore, no risks of information exposure
arise at the SP.
  The protocol itself does not impose major com-
putational overheads on any of the involved
parties, although there may be a cost associ-
ated with the countermeasures against the at-
tacks described in section 4.
  Changes in the deployed GSM infrastructure
are minimal, in particular, the SIM does not
need to be modified.
  The GSM operator could provide the SPs with
user profile information (with the user’s con-
sent). This would enable SPs to offer location
based services, or automatic form completion
for e-commerce transactions.
  As GSM operator fraud management systems
use the IMSI to refer to ‘suspect’ subscriptions,
fraud detection can easily be extended to cover
SPs.
The following disadvantages arise from use of
the proposed scheme.
  A GSM operator can only provide authenti-
cation for its subscribers. A SP can there-
fore only offer the SSO service to subscribers
of GSM operators with whom a contractual
agreement exists.
  SPs may be charged by GSM operators for au-
thentication and SSO service provision. While
this is not a disadvantage for GSM operators,
SPs must weigh the cost against the benefits
gained from the proposed scheme.
6 Using UMTS/3GPP for
SSO
A variant of the SSO protocol is now described, us-
ing the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Sys-
tem (UMTS) of the Third Generation Partnership
Project (www.3gpp.org). Like GSM, UMTS au-
thentication uses a secret key (Ki) shared between
a subscriber and the home network operator. The
main difference is that the network sends an ‘au-
thentication token’ (AUTN) as well as the RAND
to the subscriber’s ME [1]. The AUTN can only be
produced by the home network AuC. The variant
SSO protocol operates as follows.
1. US → SP: IMSI
2. SP → AuC: IMSI
3. AuC → SP: RAND, AUTN
4. SP → US: RAND, AUTN
5. US → SP: MACIK(SPID)
6. SP → AuC: MACIK(SPID), IMSI, RAND
7. AuC → SP: Authentication Assertion or Fail-
ure Notification
The US sends its IMSI to the SP (message 1)
which forwards it to the AuC (message 2). The
AuC generates a random challenge (RAND) and
computes the AUTN as a function of RAND and
the secret key Ki that corresponds to the given
IMSI. The RAND and AUTN values are sent back
to the SP (message 3) and forwarded to the US
(message 4).
The US’s SIM checks the validity of AUTN
and, if valid, generates an ‘integrity key’ IK as a
function of RAND and its secret key Ki, just as it
does during normal UMTS authentication [1]. The
US uses this key (rather than the encryption key
Kc) to compute a MAC on the SP’s unique identi-
fier (SPID).
The rest of the protocol is similar to the GSM
version. In message 5 the US sends the MAC to
the SP which forwards it to the AuC in message 6,
while appending the US’s IMSI and the RAND of
message 3 (message 6 corresponds to a Liberty au-
thentication request [13]). The AuC derives the
integrity key IK from the RAND and the secret
Ki corresponding to the given IMSI. Using it,
the AuC computes a MAC on the SPID of the SP
from which it received message 6. If it matches the
MAC of message 6 then the authentication process
is deemed successful. If that it the case, the last
message, which corresponds to a Liberty authenti-
cation response, contains an assertion; otherwise it
contains a failure notification.
As in the GSM version of the protocol (sec-
tion 3.2), the US must authenticate the SP prior to
use of the protocol, and communications between
SP and AuC must be mutually authenticated and
integrity protected (see section 4.4).
Some of the ‘side effects’ when using the proto-
col described in this section, compared to its GSM
version described in section 3.2, are the following:
  As the RAND is generated by the AuC instead
of the SP, the risk of poor random number gen-
eration (see section 4.6) is taken away from in-
dividual SPs. Associated computational costs,
however, are centralised at the AuC.
  The number of messages has almost doubled.
This could lead to increased response times.
  Validation of the AUTN of message 4 by the
US provides for AuC authentication, integrity
and freshness assurance [1]. As a result, pre-
vious (RAND, AUTN) pairs cannot be reused.
The process is thus in this case no longer inde-
pendent of subscriber authentication over the
UMTS air interface.
7 Related Work
An overview of SSO architectures and related tech-
nologies is provided by De Clercq [3]. Specifica-
tions that relate to SSO among disparate security
domains include SAML [15] and the Liberty Al-
liance [11].
Claessens et al. [2] propose a GSM-based au-
thentication method for the World Wide Web. The
proposed scheme, however, makes extensive use
of SMS messaging. There are several commercial
SSO solutions supporting authentication methods








The e-commerce user authentication protocol
proposed in [8] relies on the fact that GSM sub-
scribers and network operators share a secret key
Ki. The same fact is exploited by the protocol pro-
posed in this paper.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed SSO schemes where a GSM or
UMTS operator provides authentication assertions
to relying SPs. The schemes can potentially be
specified as Liberty profiles, thereby conforming to
this open specification.
The protocol yields a seamless user experience
as no user interactions are needed, allowing sev-
eral transparent re-authentications to occur within
a user/SP session. This leads to an equally seam-
less, secure and simple single logout mechanism.
The protocol preserves user privacy and mobility.
To protect against SIM theft or cloning, the scheme
can be complemented by an additional mechanism
such as username and password. Impersonation
will then only succeed if the attacker has access
to both the user’s SIM and password.
The required changes to the existing GSM or
UMTS infrastructure are minimal. The scheme
uses existing SIMs and appropriately equipped
MEs. The GSM or UMTS operator’s AuC, the
SPs and the US need only support the protocol
at a software level. Computational overheads are
negligible.
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